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CONTROLLING A HOT ISSUE MARKET
David Clurmant
At the end of May 1969 New York State Attorney General Louis
J. Lefkowitz requested that a study' be made of the "hot issue" secu-
rities market that had caused severe upswings in the prices of certain
new issues of stocks sold in New York State. Pursuant to this request,
I assigned several members of the bureau I head to research the matter.
We conducted an inquiry during a ninety-day period ending on Sep-
tember 1, 1969, and analyzed various facets of 103 companies that
went public for the first time in 1968-69.2
I
THE STUDY
The first matter examined was the quality of the companies and
the securities involved. A notable factor was the pattern of dilution of
the public equity in these new issues. Corporate insiders acquired
f Special Assistant Attorney General, State of New York. A.B. 1949, New York
University; LL.B. 1952, Columbia University.
I The study was made pursuant to N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352 (McKinney 1968).
This section authorizes the Attorney General to conduct an investigation into transactions
relating to the offering and sale of securities within or from the State of New York
when he deems it to be in the public interest.
2 The choices were almost literally from "out of a hat." Approximately half of the
choices were from companies that had been involved in a full registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The remainder were of the Regulation A
variety, usually involving an offering of less than $300,000.
The following table presents details as to the size of the new issue security offerings
selected for use in this study:
Number of New
Size of Offering Issues
$ 300,000 or less 52
300,001 to 500,000 5
500,001 to 1,000,000 17
1,000,001 to 2,000,000 15
2,000,001 to 3,000,000 5
5,000,001 to 4,000,000 4
4,000,001 to 5,000,000 1
6,000,001 to 7,000,000 1




large blocks of stock at nominal prices. As a result, public investors
purchasing at the offering price suffered substantial reductions in the
book value of their shares. The average dilution was sixty-five percent,
and in one case reached the preposterous amount of eighty-nine per-
cent.3
The reductions in book value are of particular significance because
these ventures frequently had no other objective criteria of value for
investors. Our findings showed that earnings per share, prior to the
public offering, were nonexistent for sixteen percent of the companies,
and where such figures were present, they were negative in an addi-
tional twenty-nine percent. The only other key factor upon which a
company could be judged was its potential for future development.
Yet there was little in the prospectuses of most of these new issues to
indicate that the issuing companies had any great promise. Indeed, as
will be seen, faith in a company's long-term prospects was not a sig-
nificant factor in inducing purchases of its securities.
The study reached the conclusion that, rather than being bona fide
new enterprises seeking capital in the securities market, many compa-
nies were merely created by underwriters for stock profits. As a result,
the underwriters were in an awkward position with respect to disclosure
of adverse information about the company during issuance or trading.
For example, one case involved an underwriter who had made a
$250,000 loan to create a new issue. When embarrassing information
was later obtained about one of the new company's officers, the under-
writer's financial commitment was too great to permit abandonment
of the issue. Direct loans, guarantee of loans, and similar machinations
by underwriters destroyed much of the protection the public should
expect from a dealer in securities. Moreover, in sixty-seven percent of
the issues analyzed, underwriters obtained warrants, generally at a
price of one cent each, which could be exercised at or within ten per-
cent of the original offering price during a three- to five-year period be-
ginning one year after the offering. The blocks of stock involved in such
arrangements ranged from five to twenty-five percent of the amount
of the original issue.
Public participation and price movement were sometimes shock-
ing. Despite the obviously weak quality of most of the new issues ana-
lyzed, they were readily sold out and almost inevitably rose in price in
the after-market. For example, the stock of one company with an appro-
priate space-age name was issued at two dollars per share and ran up
to $7.50 per share before severe swings downward. This particular
3 This stock, issued at $4 per share, -reached a'high bid of 94 before the decline began.
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company represented in its prospectus that sixty percent of the proceeds
were to be used for such items as past due accounts, repayment of
loans, back wages, back rents, and similar items. The issuer was a
constant loser in operations and had a working capital deficit. We con-
cluded that the public issue was the method used to delay bankruptcy.
Yet the price of the stock more than tripled in a short period of trading.
To determine the motivations of purchasers of these issues, the
study interviewed 122 persons who bought initial offerings.4 Certain
patterns of behavior clearly emerged. In only a small minority of cases
did investors state that the prospectus had any influence in their deci-
sion. In fact, investors largely disregarded the typical "high risk" lan-
guage of these documents; many were less than certain of what business
the company was in.
Investor selection of stock based upon judgment as to merit was
rare. The most potent component of the decision to buy was a desire
to obtain a new issue-preferably one regarding which they had re-
ceived an "inside tip." In the great majority of instances, investors
purchased at the original offering price with the intent of a quick re-
sale at a premium above that price. Approximately seventy-three per-
cent of the group that bought at the original issue price did in fact
resell, usually quite soon after the time of purchase.
In part, this investor mentality may have been created by a gen-
erally rising market that made cheaply-priced stock attractive. How-
ever, what may have begun as a natural economic phenomenon was
exploited by issuers and the investment banking community. Members
of this group used various techniques to generate interest in these
securities to increase their subsequent price moves. They then took fall
advantage of the rising temperature in the new issue market.
The basic device used to further overheat the market was stimu-
lating demand while simultaneously reducing supply. Brokers increased
demand by frequently emphasizing to their customers the difficulty of
obtaining shares. Their statements were of course often true, but by
playing upon this fact still greater demand was created. Salesmen reg-
ularly predicted that the after-market prices would be higher than the
original or current prices. Cruder techniques included brokers inform-
ing customers that if they did not make additional purchases in the
after-market they would be cut off from further new issues. In addition,
a steady flow of "tips" was fed into the market, and purchasers often
4 These persons were identified as the result of a questionnaire sent to issuers and
underwriters to determine the names of the original purchasers of the new issues under
scrutiny. Substantial numbers of such persons were invited to our office for questioning.
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stated that this type of information had stimulated their interest in a
particular security. The question of the validity of such information is
not even a logical one to ask-these companies were generally in such
an early stage of development that all predictions as to their future
were unwarranted.
The study group uncovered instances where intra-office brokerage
memoranda were inconsistent with offering literature. The former
material no doubt provided ammunition for customers' men. One
such memo contained the following gem: "OTC initially, NYSE even-
tually." In another case where the prospectus contained a "substantial-
risk" section and a cover legend emphasizing such risks, the confi-
dential underwriter memo contained a section called "Factors Limiting
Risks" as an obvious offset. Moreover, some of the names chosen by
companies were misleading on their face. Thus, a company with the
word "aerosystems" in its title was mainly involved in manufacturing
ball point pen parts.
Concurrently, various methods of reducing supply were used. In
nearly all of the offerings substantial percentages of shares registered
for sale-in certain instances up to twenty-five percent-were reserved
for employees, principals, and the like. In some cases, the underwriters
held back shares either for their own accounts or for those associated
with or related to them. At other times, underwriters made efforts to
limit supply after trading began. Thus, some customers were told that
if they sold without permission, they would not participate in the
underwriters' future distributions. In other instances, underwriters
advised customers that a stock had good long-term investment potential
and should not be quickly resold.5 As another means of limiting supply,
underwriters made heavy purchases of a new issue for discretionary
accounts, thereby gaining a large degree of effective trading control. 6
The effect of all the increased pressures of demand upon a short-
ened supply was a sharp upswing in prices in the after-market. A sam-
pling was made of the price rises of forty companies7 from the time of
initial offering through January 1969. The results follow:
5 How an underwriter could make this determination regarding an untried company
is, of course, impossible to answer.
6 Some underwriters who used this method did not deal with the general public
except for new issue distributions and trading. In one case involving such an underwriter,
a new stock moved up in price from $10 per share to approximately $100; at the dose
of our inquiry it was being sold in the $12 range.
7 The required speed of the inquiry limited an accounting study to 40 companies.
This aspect of sharply increased prices was so notorious that additional documentation
was not deemed necessary.
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Number of Companies Percentage of Increase
7 Up to 50%
5 Between 51% and 100%
10 Between 101% and 200%
11 Between 201% and 300%
3 Between 301% and 700%
4 Over 1,000%
40
Company insiders and investment bankers took full advantage of
the opportunities presented to them by the generally heated situation
-a situation that was partially of their own creation. The most ob-
vious method was the acquisition of shares at a low price for resale when
the time appeared right. At times, underwriters withheld part of the
issue for their own accounts' and then sold when they thought the
market had reached its peak. Company insiders frequently did the same
with stock they received. Resales by insiders occurred in approximately
twenty-three percent of all cases analyzed. This figure, which is based
on our questionnaires, is undoubtedly low since further insider resales
must have occurred after we received the completed questionnaires.
Furthermore, in at least one instance, insider resales appear to have
been concealed.
Beyond this, both underwriters and issuers fully utilized the oppor-
tunity to reward business associates, friends, or favorite customers for
either past transactions or anticipated future ones. As new issues grew
more difficult to obtain, the ability of issuers and their underwriters to
allocate shares became a matter of considerable import. Approximately
two-thirds of the new issue purchasers interviewed had prior business
or social contacts with either company insiders or the brokers through
whom the purchases were made. Several underwriters who were inter-
viewed during the study stated that allocations were based upon the
customer's prior business dealings with the firm and the likelihood of
a continued relationship.
The ability to allocate is enhanced in a hot issue market because
underwriters can usually predict which stocks will be mercurial in
price..Indications of interest received during the registration period,
an excellent gauge of future volatility, were in extreme cases six times
the number of shares available for public sale. The likelihood that
such shares would sell at a substantial premium in the after-market was
evident to even the most obtuse. In this type of situation, the power to
allocate was the capacity to make a gift to the favored few.
[Vol. 56:74
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Obviously, investors in the favored group received neither threats
nor suggestions that they hold the shares for any prolonged period. As
noted earlier, most original investors purchased for quick resale, and
of those interviewed who did resell, only two percent took a loss on the
transaction. While this group was able to quickly turn over shares at
substantial profits, members of the public who purchased after the stock
had risen in price were not so fortunate. A random sampling of thirty-
seven new issues indicated that in a seven-month period8 the price level
in the majority of these companies declined more than forty percent
from the original issue price.
The study made a random investigation of the use of proceeds by
issuing companies and compared the results with representations in
their prospectuses. We concluded that, in some cases, promoters inter-
preted prospectuses quite liberally. In one $300,000 new issue that more
than tripled in price, the various purposes of the public issue enumer-
ated in the prospectus did not include personal loans to officers. Yet
$19,000 of the $247,000 net proceeds was used to make such loans. In
addition, the prospectus indicated that $130,000 of proceeds was to be
used for asset acquisition; however, only $59,000 was used for that pur-
pose. The company did adhere to its representation that $40,000 would
be used for management salaries.
Although the purpose of this inquiry was to report on the me-
chanics of new issues, we were forced to recommend immediate remedial
action by one company with respect to its use of proceeds. There a
'"prestige" offering that jumped seventy-five points within four weeks
of being marketed applied $13.5 million of its proceeds to investments
considered by this office inconsistent with the prospectus representa-
tions. At our insistence, the money was immediately redirected to
where it should have gone in the first place. We concluded that this
situation and similar ones were the result of a desire to maintain the
initial high market prices by stimulating company performance.
II
RECOMMENDATIONS
Confronted by these findings, the study group tackled the problem
of making recommendations that would eliminate,, or at least reduce,
some of the problems revealed by the study. We were very little aided
8 The end of January ,1969 through the end of August 1969. Considering the pre-
mium paid over the issue price by such after-market purchasers, their real losses were,
in many cases, much more substantial.
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by suggestions made in writings on the securities market or by extant
state and federal legislation. Much of the existing regulation of new
issues is aimed principally at curbing old-fashioned "boiler-room"'
frauds; it has not been adapted to deal with the more sophisticated
maneuverings of a hot issue market.9 Based on our own experience and
the results of this study, we urge appropriate government regulatory
agencies and the securities industry to consider the following recom-
mendations.
1. The problems surrounding new issues have tended to recur
periodically, usually at five- or six-year intervals, when the securities
market is sought out by numerous investors interested in "hot" new
issues because of the likelihood of major upswings in prices. Therefore,
it would not be appropriate to impose rules or regulations that might
endanger or obstruct the free flow of capital to new issue financing
during periods of time when the problems uncovered by the study do
not exist. Instead, state legislation that would authorize the Attorney
General to cool the type of new issue market that existed in 1968-69
may be necessary. Such authorization should specifically include: (a)
stand-by power to act when the Attorney General determines that the
new issue market is approaching dangerous levels of heated activity,
and makes a formal finding to that effect; and (b) authorization to act
whenever the price of a specific new issue suddenly begins to spurt in
the absence of available financial information about the company or
its activities.
This authorization would add to new issue, over-the-counter trans-
actions the "halt in trading" concept now employed by national stock
exchanges when unusual price variations in listed stocks are not sub-
stantiated by sufficient business information. Just as such regulation by
the exchanges has proved helpful in avoiding the untoward effects of
9 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4963 (April 14, 1969); 85 SEC ANN. REP. 26-41
(1969); SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURIES MARKcrs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 481 (1968); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act,
28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 29 (1959).
The SEC studies of 1963 and 1969 strengthen only slightly the limited safeguards
provided by the prospectus requirements. Not much has been added to the basic regula-
tory concept since President Roosevelt said in his March 29, 1988, message to Congress:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued secu-
rities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the
properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity
and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue
shall be concealed from the buying public.
2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANxm D. RoosEmLT 93 (S. Rosemnan ed. 1988).
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rumors and misrepresentations, similar authority vested in the State
Attorney General's office would assure adequate disclosure of informa-
tion about companies involved in heated initial trading based largely,
on rumors. Furthermore, the Attorney General should be authorized
to impose a standard three- to five-day trading hiatus between the
issue date and the start of after-market trading (and the receipt of
orders) whenever a general pattern of huge differentials between issue
price and opening price begins to emerge in market trading, evidencing
high pressure activities in the new issue market.10
2. Legislation should be considered that would forbid a new issue
company to use proceeds of an offering for purposes other than those
specified in the prospectus for a reasonable period of time after issue.
Most securities laws applicable to new issues concentrate on practices
at the time of offering and sale of securities; there is too little concern
for the use of proceeds as measured against the representations con-
tained in the prospectus. Later reporting by a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement is not adequate. Examination of such financial state-
ments by the study group led to the conclusion that inappropriate use
of funds can easily be hidden by standard accounting practice.
3. To effectuate the second recommendation, certain companies
should be required, for a period of at least a year, to submit detailed
monthly statements to the State Attorney General indicating the use
of proceeds, and such information should be made available to the
public immediately.
4. The appropriate state and federal government agencies should
consider a prohibition, by administrative act or by new legislation, that
would bar securities salesmen and others in the underwriting firm from
having any discussion with customers regarding the likelihood of a
future new issue exceeding the offering price. The pervasiveness of
this practice clearly indicated that the general anti-fraud provisions of
existing laws are inadequate, and that specific and detailed regulations
prohibiting this type of salesmanship are needed.
5. Consideration should be given to prohibitions or limitations
on the sale of new issue securities to discretionary accounts controlled
by the underwriter when that control could easily result in manipula-
tion of the market for the new issue.
10 While the SEC has on a few occasions taken similar steps under the Investment
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964), regarding mutual funds, there has been
no substantial government activity along the lines recommended for new issues in general.
Because the great majority of transactions in the new issue market commence within the
State of New York, it would be appropriate to amend Article 23-A of the General
Business Law to give the above-recommended stand-by power to the Attorney General.
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6. Prospectuses used in the securities market for new issues should
be simplified so that interested members of the public can at least
understand them.
CONCLUSION
In examining the new issue market of the 1968-69 period,1 perhaps
the most striking feature is the nearly total ineffectiveness of the tra-
ditional disclosure approach to regulation of securities offerings. The
basic philosophy behind disclosure is that it will have some effect in
deterring "fraudulent" promotions and in directing the flow of capital
resources into those ventures which can make most effective use of
them. Obviously, disclosure alone cannot achieve these goals; still, its
complete failure here is too serious to overlook.
In this recent new issue market, a pattern emerged whereby sub-
stantial sums of money went into new and highly speculative ventures.
The securities of these companies generally rose in price, frequently
beyond all rational value, and then returned to earth when the inev-
itable cooling-off period began. Investments in these companies were
rarely made on the basis of their merits. The atmosphere became one
of pure gambling, and in the process it was not too difficult to rig the
game. The big winners were underwriters, insiders of the issuing com-
panies, and those with contacts in these groups. The losers were those
investors who purchased at inflated prices and the economy itself. As
money poured into newly-formed companies, these ventures had little
choice but to seek quick investment of the funds received, thereby
placing greater inflationary pressure on an already troubled economy.
Following the submission of the study group's report to Attorney
General Lefkowitz, remedial legislation was introduced during the New
York State Legislature's 1970 session.12 That legislation failed to be
released from committee, perhaps because the depressed condition of
the market made the problem appear academic. However, in order to
prepare for future hot issue markets, the states and the Securities and
Exchange Commission should consider the problems uncovered by the
study group and its recommendations at once.
11 Gross new issue activity peaked in the second half of 1968. Gross common stock
offerings totaled almost $2.4 billion, involving over 700 new common stock issues (a rise
of approximately 70% over the first half of 1968). FE. RMVE BANK OF N.Y. MoNTLY
RAv., April 1969, at 84-86.
12 (1970) Sen. Int. No. 8439 (Mr. Dominick), (1970) Assy. Int. No. 5703 (Mr. Biondo).




The following legislation was drafted by the author at the request of
Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz:
Section 1. Article twenty-three-A of the general business law is hereby
amended by adding thereto a new section, to be section three hundred fifty-
nine-gg, to read as follows:
§ 359-gg. New financing. 1. Whenever the attorney general determines
that the opening market for new issues of securities, of companies which
have never previously issued securities directly or indirectly to the public,
has resulted in selling practices constituting a danger to the investing public
and the economy of this state because of rampant speculation in new issues
in their opening markets in this state, he may hold a public hearing at
which interested members of the securities industry, issuing companies and
members of the public may testify as to the need for further action to be
taken pursuant to this section.
2. If the attorney general finds that circumstances warrant, within one
year after such public hearing, he may take all or any of the following
steps:
a. He may issue an order suspending the trading in a particular stock,
but not longer than a ten-day period, where he finds that there is a lack of
business information to substantiate price variations of stock newly issued
or about to be issued.
b. He may issue an order imposing a standard one to three day trading
gap between the issue date and the start of after market trading for all new
issues, whenever he finds the pattern of large differentials between issue
prices and opening prices emerging in market trading, evidencing general
high pressure activities in the new issue market.
c. He may issue an order cancelling or suspending the registration, filed
under section three hundred fifty-nine-e of this article, of any broker, dealer
or salesman who it is found, after a hearing, based on substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, has predicted, promised, estimated or suggested to
members of the public what the opening after market price or prices of
particular new issues will be.
3. Anyone aggrieved by any rule or determination by the attorney
general under this section shall be entitled to a review thereof under article
seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.
4. The provisions applicable to subpoenas contained in section three
hundred fifty-two of this article shall be applicable to hearings and proceed-
ings conducted under this section.
5. Nothing contained in this section shall diminish, reduce or affect the
other provisions of this article.
6. Any violation of any rule, order or regulation issued by the attorney
general under this section shall constitute a fraudulent practice and subject
the perpetrator to an injunctive proceeding under section three hundred
fifty-three of this article and shall constitute violation of law under section
three hundred fifty-nine-g thereof.
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